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Abstract--In the power markets, the ancillary services are 
treated as special commodities. Operating reserve is an important 
commodity in the category of ancillary services, which supports 
the system reliability against unexpected generator outages. In 
this paper, we study the procurance of operating reserve via two 
approaches, i.e. contract-based model and pool-based model. In 
order to guarantee the availability of reserved capacity and 
reduce the loss of consumer at generator forced outages, 
insurance policy is applied. Decentralized optimal decision is 
adopted. After presenting the math models of the two approaches, 
it is proven that pool-based approach is more cost-effective and 
should be adopted in the deregulated power markets. 
 
Index Terms-- Ancillary Service, Decentralized Optimization, 
Deregulated Power Markets, Insurance Theory 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
ectricity is a very special product. It is not storable and the 
demands are fluctuating and lack of elasticity, therefore it 
is difficult to realize real-time power balance at lower cost. In 
the power market, not only electricity, but also transmission 
services and ancillary services are important commodities to 
be traded. Operating reserve is an important commodity in the 
category of ancillary services, which supports the system 
reliability against unexpected generation outages. In traditional 
power systems, the ancillary services are usually centrally 
handled. The system operator will determine the reserves 
requirement and procure it from the reserve suppliers. And the 
corresponding cost is then allocated to the consumer based on 
electricity consumption of individual end users. 
It is well known that, in conventional power systems, the 
reserve requirement is determined more on reliability 
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viewpoint than on cost-effective viewpoint. More often, the N-
1 security criterion is used, i.e. the reserved capacity should at 
least be greater than or equal to the largest generation unit, and 
in the meantime based on experiences the reserved capacity 
should be no less than a certain percentage of total operation 
capacity. In the power industry deregulation, the responsibility 
for and procurance of reserve are studied in quite a few papers 
[1-5]. However, most of the researches use centralized 
approaches.  
A centralized handling and decision on ancillary service 
and a uniform pricing scheme definitely cannot reflect the need 
of the consumers. i.e. consumers have no choices on preferred 
reliability level and cost-effective operating reserve. Besides 
there are no incentives for the system operator to make 
efficient decision on reserved capacity. There are also no 
incentives for the reserve capacity providers to commit the 
requested reserve capacity. Therefore, the flexibility, 
efficiency and quality of the current ancillary service markets 
are in question. Besides in case of electricity supply 
interruption, the consumers will suffer great economic risk.  
According to the market economy principles, the best way 
for efficient commodity transaction is to allow decentralized 
optimal decisions and it makes use of the ‘invisible hand’ of 
the market to induce optimal social welfare and market 
efficiency. In [6], a conceptual study on reserve capacity 
procurance is conducted with insurance theory applications 
[7,8]. A power insurer is introduced. It represents the 
consumer (also the insured) to purchase reserve capacity from 
gencos and sells insurance policy to the consumers.  
The results of [6] are very challenging: 
∙ The operating reserve market allows the power 
consumers to determine their own reserve requirements.  
∙ The decentralized optimal decision becomes possible, 
and yields the same optimal results as the centralized 
optimal decision. 
∙ With insurance policy, the consumers can shift the 
outage risk to the power insurer. 
∙ The insurance policy induces an incentive and enforces 
the liability for the insurer to manage the reserve 
capacity. 
However, the model used in [6] is very simple and limited 
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to one generation, one consumer and one insurer only. In this 
paper, we will extend the mechanism in [6] to multi-player 
cases. In order to simplify our analytical study, we assume the 
studied system has N identical gencos and M identical 
consumers. Two approaches are investigated. One is contract-
based approach, and the other pool-based approach. In both 
cases, N-1 security assumption will hold; i.e. only one 
generator will outage at a time. The mathematic models and 
optimal decision procedures are presented. It is proven that 
pool-based approach is more cost-effective and should be 
adopted in the deregulated power markets. 
This paper is organized as follows. The details of the 
reserve capacity market mechanism with the contract-based 
approach are introduced in section II. The market with pool-
based approach is studied in section III. In section IV, the 
comparison is made between the two approaches and it is 
proven pool-based approach is more cost-effective. 
Conclusions are drawn in section V. 
II.  CONTRACT-BASED APPROACH 
We assume that there are three types of players in the 
market: N gencos ( ), 1iG i N= L , M consumers 
( , , 1 , 1 ,i jC i N j H M N H= = = ⋅L L ) and a power insurer 
(I). We assume all the N gencos are identical and the M 
consumers are identical as well. The gencos provide both 
electric energy and reserve capacity on requests. The gencos 
want to maximize their own profits, so do the consumers. In 
the electricity market, gencos sell power to consumers at the 
Market Clearing Price (MCP). The total power supply S∑  is 
assumed to be equal to the total demand Q∑  with transmission 
loss neglected. It is reasonable to assume that genco i 
maintains an acceptable outage probability ( )0 1i iOP OP< <  
declared in the contract. We can use penalty system to enforce 
the liability for the genco to maintain iOP . In this paper, we 
assume the penalty system is in well operation, therefore iOP  
is fixed in our study. 
In this section, a contract-based model for reserve 
procurance will be derived. Assume each genco ( iG ) has 
bilateral contracts to sell real power to H consumers denoted 
as group i (see Fig. 1.). ,i jC  denotes consumer j of group i 
with bilateral contract with genco i. 
GN 
CN,H CN,1 
Gi 
Ci,1 Ci,H Ci,j 
G1 
C1,1 C1,H 
M N H= ⋅  
Fig. 1.  Contract-based model for operating reserves 
The consumers can obtain benefits via purchase real power, 
but they will suffer loss (outage cost ,i jOC ) when the outage 
occurs. Assuming that the consumer’s benefit via utilizing 
power ,i jQ , is ( ), ,i j i jB Q . The function ( ), ,i j i jB Q usually has 
the following characteristics: ( )
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In the contract-based approach, we assume if genco iG  
outages, the supply to consumers , , 1i jC j H= L  who have 
contracts with iG will be interrupted; while the other 
consumers should not be affected (although they are all 
connected to the same network). Therefore, when genco iG  
outages, the consumer ,i jC  will lose all fed power ,i jQ . The 
outage cost for consumer ,i jC  with reserve capacity ,i jT  and 
the corresponding energy cost in fuel cost nature 
( ),1 RE i jC T HH ⋅  can be express as 
( )
( )
( ) ( )
, , ,
, ,
, , ,
1
i j i j i j
i j i j
i j i j RE i j
B Q MCP Q
OC T t
B T C T H
H
  − ⋅  
= ⋅ ∆  
− − ⋅    
 (2)  
The first term within the bracket is the expected net profit 
without any outage at known electricity market clearing price 
(MCP) and the second term within the bracket is the expected 
net profit when an outage occurs. Because of N-1 security and 
identical consumer assumptions, the total reserve capacity will 
be ( ),i jT H⋅ , and the corresponding energy cost ( ( )REC ⋅ ) will 
be shared by H consumers in load group i. The capacity cost in 
(opportunity cost nature), which is constantly paid no matter 
you use the reserve energy or not, will be considered 
separatley. The outage cost of consumer ,i jC  should be zero 
when genco kG  ( )k i≠  outages. Therefore, the expected 
outage cost ( ), ,i j i jEOC T  for consumer ,i jC  can be defined as 
the product of the outage probability and the outage cost cause 
by the genco iG  outage only, i.e. 
 ( ) ( ), , , ,i j i j i i j i jEOC T OP OC T= ⋅  (3) 
There is an incentive for the consumers to spend certain 
amount of money to reduce the loss, e.g. to purchase insurance 
policy. The consumers will also optimize their decisions on 
,i jT  according to the reserve capacity price of reserves and 
their own outage cost functions.  
Assume the power insurer acts as both an insurer and a 
reserve schedule coordinator concurrently, and he is a non-
profit operator. (There is no difficulty to include the profit.) 
Without considering the administration cost, his expected 
profit is assumed to be zero. It is also assumed that the reserve 
capacity cost curve ( )RC T∑  is known, where T∑  is system-
wide total reserve. The corresponding cost of the reserve 
capacity is allocated fairly to the consumers based on reserve 
capacity requested by individual consumers.  
The insurance policy for the power consumers is designed 
1398
 as follow: once the power consumer ,i jC  has purchased the 
insurance policy with reserve capacity of ,i jT . The power 
insurer will procure the amount of reserved capacity ,i jR  from 
the supplies, and the reserve capacity will be supplied to the 
consumer ,i jC  in the event of genco i outage. Consumer ,i jC  
should pay corresponding cost ( ) /RC T M∑  for the reserved 
capacity.  In the meantime, the consumer can claim a 
percentage of his outage loss (say , ,, 0 1i j i jK K≤ ≤ ) to be 
compensated by the insurer in case outage happens, however, 
he must pay a certain premium ( ), , ,,i j i j i jp T K  for it. The total 
premium for the insurance policy to be paid by ,i jC  to the 
insurer should be ( M N H= ⋅ , see Fig. 1):  
 ( ) ( ) ( ), , , , , , ,, , 0 1Ri j i j i j i j i j i j i jC Tp T K K EOC T KM ∑= + ⋅ ≤ ≤  (4) 
where ,i jT : requested reserve capacity by the consumer ,i jC , 
in MW; ,i jK : percentage of the outage loss of consumer to be 
insured; ( )RC T∑ : the total cost for the power insurer to 
procure the total reserved capacity T∑ ; ( ), ,i j i jEOC T : 
expected outage loss of the consumer when the reserved 
capacity is ,i jT .  The second term is indeed the premium 
corresponding to the insurance policy itself [8]. Since 
reference [6] has proved that the optimal decision of each 
consumer is to purchase the full compensated insurance policy, 
so , 1i jK = . With the N-1 security assumption, the rational 
insurer and consumers know the reserves T∑  can be repeatedly 
used by the N groups. Meanwhile, for a generator outage, only 
relevant H consumers will suffer from the outage in contract-
based approach. Therefore, the premium in (4) is 
( ),i jT T H∑ = ⋅ : 
  ( ) ( ) ( ),, , , ,R i ji j i j i j i jC T Hp T EOC TM
⋅
= +  (5) 
The consumer with the insurance policy has the follow 
expected-cost minimization problem 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
,
, , , , , , , ,
i j
i j i j i j i j i j i j i j i jT
Min TC T EOC R p T EOC R= + −  (6.a) 
 ( ) ( ) ( )
,
,
, , , ,
i j
R i j
i j i j i i j i jT
C T H
Min TC T OP OC T
M
⋅
= + ⋅  (6.b) 
The first term of (6.a) is the expected outage cost when real 
reserved capacity provided to ,i jC  is ,i jR , the second term is 
the premium paid for the insurance policy and the third term is 
the expected claim received from the insurer to compensate the 
outage loss. The optimal ,i jT  for (6) should satisfy 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
, ,
, , ,
,
, , ,
0 , . . 0i j i j R i j i i j i j
i j
R i j i i j i j
TC T Hi e C T H OP OC T
T M
C T H N OP OC T
∂
′ ′= ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ =
∂
′ ′=> ⋅ = − ⋅ ⋅
 (7) 
The L.H.S of (7) is the marginal cost of reserves and the 
R.H.S. of (7) is the marginal reducing of the expected outage 
cost. 
The purchase of insurance policies by M consumers is 
according to their outage cost function (see (2)). However, the 
power insurer might not buy total reserve capacity from gencos 
at requested T∑ . Indeed the insurer is facing the follow 
expected-cost minimization problem with the real reserve 
capacity R∑  ( ),i jR R H∑ = ⋅  to be optimized: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
, , , ,
, ,
, , , ,
ins R i j i j i j i jR i j i j
R i i j i j i j i j
Min C R C R EOC R p T
C R M OP OC R M p T
∑
∑ ∑
∑
= + −
= + ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅
∑ ∑
 (8) 
where the first term is the total cost to procure the total 
reserves, the second term is the total expected claim pay to the 
consumers for compensating their loss at genco outages and 
the third term is the total premium received from the 
consumers. Substituting (5) into (8), the optimal R∑  for (8) 
should satisfy ( ), /i jR R H∑= : 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
, , ,
, , ,
10 , . . 0ins R i j i i j i j
R i j i i j i j
C R
i e C R H M OP OC R
R H
C R H N OP OC R
∑
∑
∂
′ ′= ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ =
∂
′ ′=> ⋅ = − ⋅ ⋅
 (9) 
Comparing (7) and (9) we can see that the optimal reserve 
,i jR  maintained by the insurer is exactly the same as optimal 
reserve ,i jT  requested by the consumer ,i jC , which is very 
attractive property of the approach. And ( ) 0insC R∑ =  when 
R T∑ ∑= , since the power insurer is non-profit operator. 
If the centralized decision approach is used, the system-
wide expected cost ( )CBTC R∑  minimization without insurance 
policy is ( ),i jR R H∑ = ⋅ : 
 ( ) ( ) ( ), ,CB R i i j i jRMin TC R C R M OP OC R∑ ∑ ∑= + ⋅ ⋅  (10) 
the centralized optimal solution R∑  can be solved for using the 
first order condition: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
, ,
, ,
10 , . . 0CB R i i j i j
R i i j i j
TC R
i e C R M OP OC R
R H
C R N OP OC R
∑
∑
∑
∑
∂
′ ′= + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ =
∂
′ ′=> = − ⋅ ⋅
 (11) 
We can see that the decentralized decision approach has the 
same optimal solution (see (7) and (9)) as the centralized 
decision (see (11)). 
In this section, the contract-based approach for operating 
reserve has been introduced. For each genco outage, we 
assume only a small group of consumers will suffer the loss. 
With the N-1 assumption, the reserves can be repeatedly used. 
III.  POOL-BASED APPROACH  
In this section, a pool-based approach for operating reserve 
will be considered. Still there are N identical gencos 
( , 1iG i N= L ), M identical consumers ( , 1jC j M= L ) and 
a power insurer (I) in the market (see Fig. 2). The 
characteristics of those participants are same as described in 
the previous section. However in the pool-based approach, for 
each genco outage, all the consumers in the pool will lose a 
small amount of power supply. 
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Fig. 2.  Pool-based model for operating reserves 
 
Therefore, when genco iG  outages, the outage cost for 
consumer jC  can be expressed as 
 ( )
( )
( )
,
1
j j j
j
j j i j
j i j
j
j i RE j
B Q MCP Q
Q
B Q S TOC S T tQ
Q
MCP Q S C T M
Q M
∑
∑
  − ⋅      
− +   
= ⋅ ∆   
−     
− ⋅ − − ⋅ ⋅       
 (12) 
where i i
i
S S N S∑ = = ⋅∑ : total supply, 
j j
j
Q Q M Q∑ = = ⋅∑ : total demand, jT : reserve capacity of 
consumer j, and S Q∑ ∑= . ( )RE jC T M⋅  is the energy cost for 
total reserve jT T M∑ = ⋅ . 
We can simplify the outage cost function as 
 ( )
( )
( )1
j j j
j
j j j
j j
j
j RE j
B Q MCP Q
Q
B Q TOC T tN
Q
MCP Q C T M
N M
  
− ⋅      
− +  
= ⋅ ∆   
−     
− ⋅ − − ⋅      
 (13) 
The expected outage cost ( )j jEOC T  for consumer jC  is 
defined as the summation of the products of outage probability 
iOP  and the outage cost cause by genco iG  outage for 
1, ,i N= L , i.e..  
 ( ) ( ) ( )j j i j j i j j
i
EOC T OP OC T N OP OC T= ⋅ = ⋅ ⋅∑  (14) 
Base on the assumption of identical gencos and consumers, 
with insurance policy, the premium function of consumer j in 
the pool model can be expressed as ( ),i jT T M∑ = ⋅  
  
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
R
j j j j
R j
i j j
C T
p T EOC T
M
C T M
N OP OC T
M
∑
= +
⋅
= + ⋅ ⋅
 (15) 
The consumer with the insurance policy has the follow 
expected-cost minimization problem similar to (6): 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
j
j j j j j j j jT
Min TC T EOC R p T EOC R= + −  (16) 
Substituting (15) into (16) , yield: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )
j
R j
j j i j jT
C T M
Min TC T N OP OC T
M
⋅
= + ⋅ ⋅  (17) 
The optimal jT  for (17) should satisfy 
 ( ) ( ) ( )0 , . . 0j j R j i j j
j
TC T
i e C T M N OP OC T
T
∂
′ ′= ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ =
∂  
 ( ) ( )R j i j jC T M N OP OC T′ ′=> ⋅ = − ⋅ ⋅  (18) 
jT  can be solve for from (18), where the marginal cost of 
reserve capacity equals to the marginal reducing of the 
expected outage cost. However, the power insurer might not 
keep total reserve capacity at requested jT T M∑ = ⋅ . Indeed 
insurer is facing the follow expected-cost minimization 
problem similar to (8) with the real reserve capacity R∑  to be 
optimized ( jR R M∑ = ⋅ ) 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
ins R j j j jR j j
R j i j j j
Min C R C R M EOC R p T
C R M M N OP OC R M p T
∑
∑ = ⋅ + −
= ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅
∑ ∑
 (19) 
The optimal R∑  for (19) should satisfy 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) 10 , . . 0ins R j i j jC R i e C R M M N OP OC RR M∑∑
∂
′ ′= ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ =
∂
 
 ( ) ( )R j i j jC R M N OP OC R′ ′=> ⋅ = − ⋅ ⋅  (20) 
Comparing (18) and (20) we can see that the optimal 
reserve jR  maintained by the insurer will be the same as the 
optimal reserve jT  requested by the consumer jC . And 
( ) 0insC R∑ =  when R T∑ ∑= , since the power insurer is non-
profit operator. 
If the centralized decision approach is used, the social 
expected cost ( )PoolTC R∑  minimization without insurance 
policy is ( jR R M∑ = ⋅ ) 
 ( ) ( ) ( )Pool R j i j jRMin TC R C R M M N OP OC R∑ ∑ = ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅  (21) 
The centralized optimal solution R∑  can be solved for from 
(21) : 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
10 , . . 0Pool R j i j j
R j i j j
TC R
i e C R M M N OP OC R
R M
C R M N OP OC R
∑
∑
∂
′ ′= ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ =
∂
′ ′=> ⋅ = − ⋅ ⋅
(22) 
Comparing (18) and (20) with (22), we can conclude that 
with the insurance policy the decentralized optimal decision 
yields the same optimal solution as the centralized optimal 
decision.  
IV.  COMPARISON OF THE TWO APPROACHES 
In the previous two sections, we have shown that, with a 
well-defined insurance policy global optimal results can be 
reached via decentralized decisions, in which each market 
participant tries to maximize its own benfit. 
Because of the difference between the outage cost functions 
under the contract-based model and the pool-based model, for 
the same amount of reserve, the two models will have different 
total costs for reserves, i.e. ,i j
R
OC
H
∑     of each consumer in 
contract-based approach is not equal to j
R
OC
M
∑    of each 
consumer in pool-based approach, and  
 ( ) ( )CB PoolTC R TC R∑ ∑≠  (23) 
Let *R∑  be the optimal solution under the contract-based 
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model and R ∆∑  be the optimal solution under the pool-based 
model. The two optimal results will not equal to each other. A 
significant question is that which approach can induce a 
cheaper total expected cost. The conclusion is the pool-based 
approach is more cost-effective, which is proven below. 
Let the function ( )TC R∑∆  be the difference between the 
total cost function under contract-based approach ( )CBTC R∑  
and the total cost function under the pool-based approach 
( )PoolTC R∑ . 
 ( ) ( ) ( )CB PoolTC R TC R TC R∑ ∑ ∑∆ = −  (24) 
According to the total cost functions in (10) and (21), we have 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
, ,
, ,
R i i j i j
R i j j
i i j i j j j
TC R C R M OP OC R
C R M N OP OC R
M OP OC R N OC R
∑ ∑
∑
 ∆ = + ⋅ ⋅ 
 
− + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ 
 = ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ 
 (25) 
Based on the outage cost functions (2) and (12), (25) will be: 
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( )
, , ,
, , ,
1
1
i j i j i j
i j i j RE i j
j j j
i
j
j j i j
j
j i RE j
B Q MCP Q
t
B T C T H
H
B Q MCP Q
TC R M OP
Q
B Q S RN tQ
Q
MCP Q S C T M
Q M
∑
∑
∑
   − ⋅   
⋅ ∆  
− − ⋅      − ⋅  ∆ = ⋅ ⋅       
− +   
− ⋅ ⋅ ∆   
−      
− ⋅ − − ⋅          

  (26) 
Under the same electricity market conditions, we know: 
 ( ) ( ), , ,
, , , ,
, ,
, , , ,
i j i j j j i j j
i j j i j i j j j i j j
B Q B Q Q Q Q S
R R H R R M T R T R T H T M
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
= = =
= ⋅ = ⋅ = = ⋅ = ⋅
 (27) 
Therefore we can simplify (26) to 
( )
( )
( )
j j j
i
j
j j j j
R
B Q B
H
TC R M OP t
Q RN B Q N B Q
N M
∑
∑
∑
  
−    ∆ = ⋅ ⋅ ∆ ⋅    − ⋅ + ⋅ − +    
 (28) 
At 0R∑ = , 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
0
1 11 1
j
i j j j j j j
i j j j j
Q
TC M OP t B Q N B Q N B Q
N
N M OP t B Q B Q
N N
  ∆ = ⋅ ⋅ ∆ ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ −    
     
= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ∆ ⋅ − − + −          
 (29) 
From Lemma 1 (see appendix) equation (A.2) and since 
10 1 1a
N
≤ = − ≤  ( )1N ≥ , we have: 
( )
( )
( )
1 11 1
1 11 1 0
0 0
j j j j
j j j j
B Q B Q
N N
B Q B Q
N N
TC
    
− ≤ −        
    
=> − − − ≥        
=> ∆ ≥
 (30) 
With the N-1 security assumption, the maximum amount of 
reserve R∑  is equal to the power supplied by the largest 
generation unit, i.e. j
Q
R Q
N
∑
∑ = = , then 
( ) ( )
0
j j j j j
i
j
j j
Q
B Q B N B Q
N HQ
TC M OP t
QN QN B Q
N N M
∑
∑
∑
  
− − ⋅  
⋅    ∆ = ⋅ ⋅ ∆ ⋅       + ⋅ − + 
⋅   
=
 (31) 
The first derivative of the ( )TC R∑∆  is 
( )
1
1
j
i
j
j j
j
i j j j
R
B
H H
TC R M OP t
Q RN B Q
N M M
Q R RM OP t B Q B
H N M H
∑
∑
∑
∑ ∑
  
′
− ⋅    
′∆ = ⋅ ⋅ ∆ ⋅   
′ + ⋅ − + ⋅    
    
′ ′= ⋅ ⋅ ∆ ⋅ − + −       
 (32) 
From Lemma 2 (see appendix) equation (A.7), we know: 
 ( )
( )
. 0
0
j
j
j
j j j j
Q R RQ
N M H
Q R R
B Q B B
N M H
TC R
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
∑
− + ≥
   
′ ′ ′′=> − + ≤ ≤     
′=> ∆ ≤
Q  (33) 
Based on equations (30), (31) and (33), we know 
( ) ( ),0 0 0 , 0QTC TC TC R
N
∑
∑
 
′∆ ≥ ∆ = ∆ ≤   for 0
Q
R
N
∑
∑≤ ≤  
which means ( ) 0TC R∑∆ ≥  for all 0 QR N
∑
∑≤ ≤ , or say  
 ( ) ( )CB PoolTC R TC R∑ ∑≥  for all 0 QR N
∑
∑≤ ≤  (34) 
Denoting *R∑  as the optimal value of R∑  under the 
contract-based approach, and R ∆∑  as the optimal value of R∑  
under the pool-based approach, it is clear: 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
* , 0
, 0
CB CB
Pool Pool
Q
TC R TC R for all R R
N
Q
TC R TC R for all R R
N
∑
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
∆ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
≤ ≤ ≤
≤ ≤ ≤
 (35) 
From Eqs. (34) and (35), we can conclude: (set *R R∑ ∑=  in 
(34)) 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
* *
*
CB Pool Pool
CB Pool
TC R TC R TC R
TC R TC R
∆
∑ ∑ ∑
∆
∑ ∑
≥ ≥
=> ≥
 (36) 
Equation (36) shows the optimal total cost under the 
contract-based approach will be greater than or equal to the 
optimal total cost under the pool-based approach, no matter it 
is centralized optimal decision or decentralized optimal 
decision (we have proven they yield same value in our 
designed mechanism). In the other word, the pool-based 
approach is more cost-effective and should be adopted in the 
deregulated power markets. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In this paper, conceptual study on decentralized operating 
reserve plan is conducted. Two possible approaches are 
suggested. They are contract-based approach and pool-based 
approach. It is shown that, with the insurance policy, the 
decentralized optimal decision becomes possible and it yields 
the same optimal results as the centralized optimal decision in 
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both approaches. 
It is proven for any amount of reserved capacity, the 
optimal total cost under the contract-based approach will be 
greater than or equal to the optimal total cost under the pool-
based approach. Therefore, the pool-based approach is more 
cost-effective and should be adopted in the deregulated power 
markets. 
Further research work is required to consider non-identical 
multi-players and transmission network impacts. For a large 
system with a large number of participants, N-1 security 
assumption may not be adequate. Reserve capacity based on 
an optimal-percentage of operating capacity should be 
considered as well. 
VI.  APPENDIX 
Lemma 1: For a function ( )f x  with the follow characteristics 
 
( )
( )
( )
0 0
0 , 0
0 , 0
f
f x for x
f x for x
=
′ ≥ ≥
′′ ≤ ≥
   (A.1)  
It can be proven:  
( ) ( )a f x f a x⋅ ≥ ⋅  for 1a∀ ≥ ; and  
( ) ( )a f x f a x⋅ ≤ ⋅  for 0 1a∀ ≤ ≤  (A.2) 
Proof: 
By Taylor series, we have (if ( )3 0O x ≈ ): 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
0 0 0
2
xa f x a f a x f a f′ ′′⋅ = ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅  (A.3) 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2
0 0 0
2
a xf a x f a x f f⋅′ ′′⋅ = + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅  (A.4) 
because ( ) 0f x′′ ≤ , we can have 
(1) ( ) ( )
2 2 2
0 0
2 2
x a xa f f⋅′′ ′′⋅ ⋅ ≥ ⋅  for 1a ≥  
 ( ) ( )a f x f a x=> ⋅ ≥ ⋅  for 1a ≥  (A.5) 
(2) ( ) ( )
2 2 2
0 0
2 2
x a xa f f⋅′′ ′′⋅ ⋅ ≤ ⋅  for 0 1a≤ ≤   
 ( ) ( )a f x f a x=> ⋅ ≤ ⋅  for 0 1a≤ ≤  (A.6) 
 
Lemma 2: In the pool approach,  
 jj
Q R R
Q
N M H
∑ ∑
− + ≥  if , 1N M ≥  and Q R N∑ ∑≥ ⋅  (A.7) 
Proof: 
 ( ) ( )
( )
1 1
0 , 1 ,
j
j
Q R R Q Q R N R N
Q
N M H M M N M N H N
Q R N Q R N
M M N
N M Q R N
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑
⋅ ⋅
− + − = − + −
⋅ ⋅ ⋅
= − ⋅ − − ⋅
⋅
≥ ≥ ≥ ⋅Q
 (A.8) 
=> jj
Q R R
Q
N M H
∑ ∑
− + ≥  (A.9) 
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